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PE Strategic Leverage trom” Aid ‘and ‘Trade , Ho
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| RR —JAMES R. SCHLESINGER Fv |
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Tha Summary Co AE
Ta The analysis ‘of this paper rests on the assumption that pfs
. pe ea ey American policy-makers should not be so concerned 1with the He
: pon phi pursuit of hard-to-obtain ideological objectives that they exhaust i
fai ad the power potential implicit in trade and aid: relationships. . i
= ON Hs Rather the trade and aid programs should be managed so. as to 8] hi
Se He Lae a preserve an environment ‘in which pressures can be brought to pr
Fem gentle 9 bear to serve the national interest of a later, and perhaps more {od
: Lea ane critical, date. This emphasis on power considerations implics Free .
Eth a both (un) that the assistunce program cannot be based primarily . f=
Se Fe on humanitarian or idealistic goals, and (b) that economic tics i
: pin MAT with other nations should not be severed simply because of our : pi
fron Teen disapproval of other social systems, including those based on 1
fol MO communism. Though typically public opinion vastly overstates Hoo
pr del the strategic leverage thet can be gained through economic . iE
EL ) "weapons, this leverage is still not negligible. One can argue that ©
poo wee Bl. ©» the past the United States-hos failed to take advantage of Ko:
Se atin the power potential implicit in aid and trade through its failure fl
LR FF EA to develop concepts and mechanisms of deterrence in ways akin Hs
Ur LANAI to what has been dome in the military field, Much of the 1B
HL oy ne ERE difficulty may be ascribed to a failure to develop sanctions, : H a
CoE - which discourage actions unfavorable to our interests, as well i fF
parti ERI as incentives, which encourage cooperation. No system of -° an
foot Bae deterrence can exclusively stress the carrot and ignore the stick. . WE
a SN More is being demanded of the aid program than it can . Re
pos EL reasonably achieve, Assuming that the primary emphasis of the | IE
ATR cL aid program is to encourage social and economic development Bas
SAREE rather than to-elicit direct support for American foreign policy ee
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