CIA technical aid to the Plumbers (Ellsberg-Fielding break-in)

--- PAGE 72 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 9 May 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT : Per your instructions 1. I have no recollection of specific contacts with the Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment should be a matter of record. 2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill Colby is fully conversant are: -- CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/O. -- [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] investments and accumulation of Government capital. -- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA [REDACTED] for use against [REDACTED] -- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of L.B.J. trip to SEA. John M. Clarke 00072 EYES ONLY SECRET [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 107 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 CONFIDENTIAL 7. [blank box] 8. Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is a record of External Employment Assistance Branch's action on a request from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or resigning from the Agency. Sometime in the spring of 1972, Frank O'Malley of EEAB received a call from Howard Hunt who asked Frank if he had a retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks. Mr. O'Malley sent him a resume on Thomas Amato who retired 31 July 1971. Mr. O'Malley did not document his EEAB record to show the date of this exchange, but [REDACTED] (who also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between March and May 1972. All of the above information was reported to the Office of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with the Agency regarding Howard Hunt. 9. Resume Sent to McCord: [REDACTED] a contract employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for a job after retirement. One of the leads given to [REDACTED] James McCord's security business. EEAB sent a resume to McCord, but [REDACTED] was not hired. In mid-summer 1972, [REDACTED] telephoned EEAB from Chicago. (He had a job there with the Halifax Security Co., a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had 3 CONFIDENTIAL 00107 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 161 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 by the fact that Mr. Kane [REDACTED] Mr. Kane stated further that around Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from [REDACTED] who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. [REDACTED] asked Mr. Kane how he could got in touch with him. Mr. Kane obtained Mr. Hunt's telephone number through telephone information channels whereupon he passed the number on to [REDACTED] 7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information that [REDACTED] has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may have obtained his name from him. [REDACTED] Deputy Director of Security 00161 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 180 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 8 May 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence SUBJECT : Activities Possibly Outside CIA's Legislative Charter 1. This memorandum responds to your instruction to report any activities which might be considered outside CIA's legislative charter. 2. All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate have reviewed the past and present activities of their components. I have received responses from all of them, and none reported any activities related to either the Watergate affair or the break into the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two improper activities: Hunt: Col. White, Richard Lehman, and I talked to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation of a recommendation in support of the Agency's nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National Civil Service League Award. Mitchell: While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General, an OCI officer was assigned the task of providing him with daily briefings on foreign developments. 00180 SECRET CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 296 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 1 May 1972 DDS related that the Director of Security has received a request from the Secret Service to provide two technicians in support of the Vice President's trip to Tokyo. The Director concurred. 2 May 1972 DDS reported that the Director of Security has received a request from the Secret Service for counteraudio technicians to support the President's trip to Moscow. The Director concurred. 11 May 1972 Houston noted his correspondence with White House staffer David Young pertaining to our problems with Executive Order 11652 and added that Mr. Young has accepted our position on about 90 percent of our problems with the implementing draft directive. 24 May 1972 Houston explained that he had obtained White House Staffer David Young's understanding that we will not meet the 1 June deadline for producing internal Agency regulations implementing the NSC directive on Executive Order 11652. A brief discussion followed on the cumbersome bookkeeping, and declassification authorities which may be required. The Director observed that the topic was sufficiently important for us to be in no great rush to meet a 1 June deadline and Houston assured him that Mr. Young understands. 6 June 1972 Thuermer explained that he will continue working with the General Counsel in response to Charles Nesson's efforts to serve a subpoena on him in connection with the Ellsberg case. He noted the related article by Robert A. Wright in today's New York Times, "Hearing is Asked in Ellsberg Case." 7 June 1972 Houston noted a letter from the Justice Department conveying a subpoena directed to Angus Thuermer in connection with the Ellsberg case. He highlighted the schedule of documents requested, most of which were mentioned in footnotes to the Pentagon papers. He noted plans to ask Justice to declare the material irrelevant to the case. 00295 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 352 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 8 July 1971 DDCI reported that John Ehrlichman had telephoned to advise us that the White House is appointing former CIA employee Howard Hunt as a security consultant. Another account of the Morning Meeting of this date reads: It was also announced that Howard Hunt has been named security consultant to the White House. General Cushman told Ehrlichman that Mr. Hunt would have full cooperation from CIA. 16 July 1971 Carver said that [REDACTED] was most appreciative of the time which Houston spent with him yesterday. 22 July 1971 (the day Howard Hunt came to see General Cushman) Carver highlighted his session yesterday with NSC staffer David Young, who is assisting John Ehrlichman in reviewing the secret Pentagon papers. 18 August 1971 A-DDP noted that he has reported to White House staffer David Young on the results of the Deputy Director of Security's survey of those who saw the classified assessment upon which Tad Szulc based his 12 August article. 11 November 1971 In response to the Director's question Carver said that some work requested by John Ehrlichman is pending. The Director asked to be filled in later on the details. 18 January 1972 DDI called attention to the article in today's New York Times, "Nixon Acts to End Security Leaks." (Except from the article: "Last July, two members of the White House staff, David R. Young of the National Security Council and Egil Krogh, Jr., of the Domestic Council, were asked to investigate earlier leaks and prevent recurrences.") - 2 - 00351 SECRET SENSITIVE [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 422 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 -3- I told him that I could not tell him that further investigation would jeopardize the Agency's covert sources. I had checked on this and it was not so. I had ascertained that General Cushman had authorized the issuance of some equipment to Howard Hunt without knowing its purpose other than it was, as I understood it, to shut off "leaks" before and during the Watergate bugging. Since then I had carefully checked and there was no other involvement of any sort by the CIA in the operation against the Watergate. I said that I felt that attempts to cover this up on a basis of a need to protect sources would have no part in this and was quite prepared to resign or fire the security of our missions and he too was prepared to resign on this issue. I gave Gray a list of the equipment the Agency had given Hunt and the amount of our dealings with the former CIA employees up to the termination of their employment with the Agency long before the Watergate episode. I saw Gray again on the 12th of July and gave him one additional memorandum recording the contact furnished Hunt. We reviewed the letter given that the best solution would be to fire those responsible. Gray said he had made the same recommendation. Once again we agreed that anything that night damage the integrity of the FBI and CIA would be a grave disservice to the President and the Government. In February 1973 shortly after Dr. Schlesinger became Director I told him of my conversations with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean. In February Dean called Dr. Schlesinger to see if the Agency could get back from the FBI the material it had sent to the Justice Department concerning our contact with Hunt. Dr. Schlesinger and I agreed that this could not be done. I attempted to contact Dean but he was in Florida. On his return I saw Dean at his office on February 21 and told him that we could not ask the FBI for the material back. I told him I had only seen Acting FBI Director Gray that morning and told him of Dean's request and our refusal. He agreed saying that he could not do such a thing. Since that date I have had no further contact with Dean. The above represents my recollection of what occurred and the dates are checked in my appointment book. DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES 00417 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 423 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 9 May 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR ALL CIA EMPLOYEES 1. Recent press reports outline in detail certain alleged CIA activities with respect to Mr. Howard Hunt and other parties. The presently known facts behind these stories are those stated in the attached copy of a statement I will be making to the Senate Committee on Appropriations on 9 May. As can be seen, the Agency provided limited assistance in response to a request by senior officials. The Agency has cooperated with and made available to the appropriate law enforcement bodies information about these activities and will continue to do so. 2. All CIA employees should understand my attitude on this type of issue. I shall do everything in my power to confine CIA activities to those which fall within a strict interpretation of its legislative charter. I take this position because I am determined that the law shall be respected and because this is the best way determined to foster the legitimate and necessary contributions we in CIA can make to the national security of the United States. 3. I am taking several actions to implement this objective: - I have ordered all the senior operating officials of this Agency to report to me immediately on any activities now going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency. - I hereby direct every person presently employed by CIA to report to me on any such activities of which he has knowledge. I invite all ex-employees to do the same. Anyone who has such information should call my secretary (extension 6363) and say that he wishes to talk to me about "activities outside CIA's charter." ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY 00418 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 424 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 ADMI RATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY 4. To ensure that Agency activities are proper in the future, I hereby promulgate the following standing order for all CIA employees: Any CIA employee who believes that he has received instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative charter shall inform the Director of Central Intelligence immediately. James R. Schlesinger Director ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY CO 4184 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 425 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 DCI STATEMENT BEFORE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 9 MAY 1973 00419 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 426 --- MORI DocID: 1451943 OPENING STATEMENT Mr. Chairman, I am here to discuss the questions which have arisen over CIA's real and alleged role in events that occurred in 1971 and 1972. I have opened a detailed investigation into the precise nature of that role. I can report to you on what Agency records, now being intensively reviewed, reveal at this juncture. However I do not yet know that I have all the facts in the matter. Nonetheless, I am pleased to present to you such facts as are now available, and I will certainly provide you with any further details as they come to my attention. Let me start with the Agency's relationship with Mr. Howard Hunt, whose testimony has recently been made public. Mr. Hunt was a staff employee of the Agency from 8 November 1949 to 30 April 1970. At that time he retired from the Agency. He performed one editorial job of writing up a recommendation for an award for one of our officers in November 1970. He was not paid for these services, although the Agency placed the sums of $200.00 and $50.00 in two charitable organizations for the service performed. In early July 1971, General Cushman, then the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, received a telephone call from the White House. He was informed that Mr. Hunt had become a consultant on security affairs for the White House, and a request was made that Mr. Hunt receive assistance from the Agency. The minutes of the Agency Morning Meeting of 8 July 1971 indicate that the DDCI (General Cushman) reported a call by John Ehrlichman stating that Howard Hunt had been appointed a White House security consultant. On 22 July 1971 Mr. Hunt visited General Cushman at the CIA building. According to the records, Mr. Hunt stated that he had been charged with a highly sensitive mission by the White House to visit and elicit information 00420 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 427 --- ORT DocID: 1451843 ES : SL a2e E " | : from an individual whose ideology he was not entirely sure of, and for that . ~ purpose he said he was asked te come to the Agency to see if he could get Co two things: identification documents in alias and some degree of physical . disguise, for a one-time operation. He stressed that he wanted the matter RE to be held as closely as possible and that he vould Tike to meet the Agency - people in an Agency safehouse. Agency records indicate that, in.the course : of the conversation, Mr. flunt referred to Mr. Ehrlichman by name and General Cushman acknowledged an earlier call from Mr. Ehrlichman to him. The ) ) - Committee may desire to query General Cushman whose knowledge would not “ come from such secondary sources. : ~ ) General Cushman directed the appropriate technical service of the | . Agency to be of assistance to Mr. Hunt, based on the above request. On - 23 July 1971 Hr. Hunt was given alias documents, including a Social Security © card, driver's license, and several association membership cards, in the name of "Edward Joseph Warren" similar to material he had been furnished for operational use while he had been an Agency employee, under the name of "Edward V. Hamilton." The same day Mr. Hunt was also given disguise : materials (a wig, glasses, and a speech alteration device). . By calling an unlisted telephone number given him, Mr. Hunt arranged several additional meetings with Agency technical officers, the dates of which cannot be provided with precision. In these, he requested and was provided h a commercial tape recorder (in a typewriter case) and a commercial Tessina camera disguised in a tobacco pouch. He also brought in a then-unidentified associate (later identified from press photos as Mr. G. Gordon Liddy) and secured for him a disguise (wig and glasses) and alias documents in the name of “George fF. Leonard." ’ . . | i i 004380 : --- PAGE 428 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 -3- The Agency technical officers met these requests despite the absence of the procedural steps and approvals normally required by Agency regulations. However, they became increasingly concerned at the escalation of Mr. Hunt's requests for assistance. These finally included a request from Mr. Hunt to be met on the morning of 27 August 1971, upon his return from California, to have a film developed and returned to him. This was done the same day. He also asked for a New York mail address and telephone-answering service for operational use. The technical officers raised their concern with senior officers, who noted the possibility that these activities could involve the Agency in operations outside its proper functions. As a result, again according to Agency records, General Cushman telephoned Mr. Ehrlichman at the White House on 27 August 1971 and explained that further such assistance could not be given. Mr. Ehrlichman agreed. The request for mail address and telephone answering service was not honored. On 31 August 1971, Mr. Hunt contacted the technical officers again, requesting a credit card, but this was refused. Mr. Hunt had also made a request on 18 August 1971 for the assignment of a secretary he had known during his Agency career. This was also refused. The earlier-furnished alias documents and other material were not recovered, however, except for the Tessina camera which was returned on 27 August as unsuitable. Since the end of August 1971, the Technical Services Division has had no further association with Mr. Hunt. As a point of reference, I would note that the break-in of the office of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist took place on or about 3 September 1971. 00421 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 429 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 -4- The Agency outlined the above events to Mr. Patrick Gray, Acting Director of the FBI, in letters dated 5 and 7 July 1972, and a meeting on 28 July 1972. A series of questions were asked the Agency on 11 October 1972 by Mr. Earl Silbert, Principal Assistant, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. On 24 October 1972, Attorney General Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General Petersen reviewed the 5 and 7 July transmittals together with additional, more detailed but undated materials, that had been provided to Acting FBI Director Gray on 18 October 1972. The Agency is aware that this material was reviewed on 27 November 1972 by Mr. Silbert, who asked additional questions on that date as well as on 29 November 1972. Written responses to the foregoing questions were provided on 13 December 1972. An additional submission was made to the Assistant Attorney General Petersen on 21 December 1972. This material was discussed at a meeting held with Assistant Attorney General Petersen and Mr. Silbert on 22 December 1972. All of the foregoing materials can be made available to the Committee if it so desires. As a separate matter, which was not known by those who prepared the material for the Department of Justice in the fall of last year, the Office of Medical Services of the Agency prepared and forwarded to the White House two indirect personality assessments of Mr. Daniel Ellsberg. The Agency has had a program of producing, on a selective basis, such assessments or studies on foreign leaders for many years. In July 1971 Mr. Helms, then Director, instructed Agency officers to work with Mr. David Young of the White House Staff relative to security leaks in the intelligence community. 00442la [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 430 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 -5- Mr. Young requested a study on Mr. Ellsberg in the latter part of July 1971, which Agency activity was apparently approved by Mr. Helms. At that time, Mr. Young supplied raw material consisting principally of newspaper and magazine articles together with some State Department and Justice Department papers. The first assessment delivered to the White House dated 9 August 1971, was judged insufficient. As a result, there were several meetings between Dr. Malloy, Mr. Hunt, and Mr. Liddy, in which classified information of the Justice and State Departments was introduced. One such meeting occurred on 12 August 1971. Additional material was transmitted by Mr. Hunt on 12 October, and another meeting was held on 27 October. These meetings led to a second version of the assessment, dated 9 November 1971. This document was delivered to the Executive Office by Dr. Malloy on 12 November 1971. Agency records indicate that Mr. Helms had previously communicated with Mr. Young indicating he had read both reports. In another contact "about October 1971," an Agency officer arranged to provide Mr. Hunt certain unclassified materials from CIA files relative to a 1954 French case of leakage of Government documents. These were delivered to his office at the White House. In closing, I would like to stress several conclusions of my investigation so far: a. CIA had no awareness of the details of Mr. Hunt's activities. The Agency's impression was that Mr. Hunt was engaged in an activity related to identifying and closing off the security leaks that were so much a preoccupation of the Government at the time. 004322 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 431 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 -6- b. The Agency clearly was insufficiently cautious in the initiation of its assistance to Mr. Hunt. Later, when the nature of Mr. Hunt's requests for assistance began to indicate a possible active involvement by the Agency in activities beyond its charter, the Agency terminated the relationship and refused further assistance. c. The preparation of a profile on an American citizen under these circumstances lies beyond the normal activity of the Agency. It shall not be repeated -- and I have so instructed the staff. This shall be made a part of the regulations governing such activities. d. As Director, I have called for a review of all Agency activities and the termination of any of which might be considered outside its legitimate charter. In addition to requesting this review from my subordinates, I have directed each employee and invited each ex-employee to submit to me any cases which they may question. I am determined that the Agency will not engage in activities outside of its charter but will concentrate its energies on its important intelligence mission. 004920a [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 432 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 8 May 1973 DCI: Sy Hersh's provocative teaser for the day: "I have information that Cushman knew exactly what he was okaying when he gave approval to assist Hunt..." I attentioned Sy H. again to the statement he had given to the Times already, and told him I "noted" what he had to say today. He has calls in for you, Houston, and Colby. AMT cc: OOG OID Mr. Colby 00423 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 433 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 [Handwritten annotation at top right: "Approved for OSC" and "pr. issued"] RESPONSE TO PRESS INQUIRIES CONCERNING MR. HUNT'S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAD NO ADVANCE NOTICE OF ANY SORT WHATSOEVER OF THE BREAK IN BY MR. HUNT OF THE OFFICE OF MR. ELLSBERG'S PSYCHIATRIST OR OF THE WATERGATE INCIDENT. THE NEWSPAPER REPORTS OF THESE TWO EVENTS WERE THE FIRST NOTICE TO ANYONE IN THE AGENCY. ALL AGENCY INFORMATION ON CU R CONTACTS WITH ANY PERSONS INVOLVED IN THESE INCIDENTS HAS BEEN REPORTED FULLY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND AS INVESTIGATION OF THESE MATTERS IS IN THE HANDS OF THE COURTS AND THE GRAND JURY, ALL INQUIRIES SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. 00424 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 434 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 SECRET EYES ONLY 8 May 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee SUBJECT: Potentially Embarrassing Agency Activities The Office of the Inspector General has records on the following sensitive subjects that either have been or might in the future be the source of embarrassment to the Agency. The report of the Board of Inquiry in the case of Hans Torte. The Torte affair was fully exposed in public, of course, but the report itself is closely held within the Agency. This office was designated as the-custodian of the report, and we have the only surviving copy. An annex to the Inspector General's report of survey of the Technical Services Division done in 1953. The annex deals with experiments in influencing human behavior through the administration of mind or personality altering drugs to unwitting subjects. An Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency was instrumental in bringing about the assassination of President Diem. The allegations were determined to be without foundation. An Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency was instrumental in bringing about the assassination of President Trujillo. The investigation disclosed quite extensive Agency involvement with the plotters. An Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency conspired to assassinate Fidel Castro. The story first appeared in Drew Pearson's column and has since appeared in Jack Anderson's column. While the columns contained many factual errors, the allegations are basically true. SECRET EYES ONLY 00425 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 435 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 Page 1 SDS and other student activist groups OCI produced in December 1967 at Walt Rostow's request a 30-page typescript study of the SDS and its foreign ties. In the summer of 1968 OCI produced--again at Rostow's request-- a paper on Restless Youth. The first, and most sensitive section, was a philosophical treatment of student unrest, its motivation, history, and tactics. It drew heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on SDS and affiliated groups. The second section comprised 19 chapters on foreign student dissidence. Pages 11 & 12 Black radicalism OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism in earnest in 1968. Two papers were produced on the subject, one in August 1969 and the other in June 1970. OCI was asked in June 1970 to write a memo with special attention to links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of black power in the US. The memo was produced in typescript and given to the DCI. OCI in 1968 wrote periodic typescript memos on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad during a period when he had dropped from public view. 00426 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 436 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 Page 23 Prohibition against COINTJINT vs. US citizens In September 1972 [REDACTED] Memo to conduct hearability testes of certain HF long-distance commercial telephone circuits between the US and South America. The circuits carried drug- related traffic. [REDACTED] The tests were successful. The activity was terminated on 30 Jan 73 following CGC determination that they were illegal. We conduct an intercept operation in [REDACTED] targeted on radio telephone conversations. [REDACTED] These intercepts contain a large number of unrelated conversations often involving US citizens. Testing in the US of OID-developed electronic collection systems will result in the collection of domestic telephone conversations. When the tests are complete, the intercepted material is destroyed. CIA [REDACTED] technicians conducted tests in the Miami area in August 1971 OF OF gear intended for use against a Soviet agent in South Vietnam. While wholly innocuous, the tests preceded the holding of the conventions there and could be construed as being somehow related to them. In February 1972 CIA asked an official of AT&T for copies of telephone call slips relating to US-China calls. The operation lasted for three or four months and then dried up. CGC stated its belief that the collection of these slips did not violate the Communications Act since eavesdropping was not involved. Page 29 Mail coverage Since 1953, CIA has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selected mail at Kennedy Airport in New York City. This program is now dormant pending decision on whether to continue or to abolish it. 00427 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 437 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 CONFIDENTIAL 8 May 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. W. E. Colby Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee FROM : Director, National Estimates SUBJECT : Comments on Proposed DCI Statement (Hunt Case) Since you are aware that I have no facts bearing on the case, I take it that you asked for comment from the following point of view: will the proposed statement be well received by the committee? The main questions in the committee's mind will be: Did CIA cooperate wittingly in activities which were both illegal and outside its charter? Or did it only respond supinely to higher authority even though it had some reason for suspecting illegal conduct? Tactically, I think there would be advantage in coming to grips frankly with these questions in the statement itself. The text in its present form could be taken as a minimum factual response which doesn't quite get at the heart of the matter. I think it preferable, in the interest of the Agency's reputation on the Hill, to proceed to candor directly rather than to be drawn to it by subsequent questioning. Key follow-up questions which can be anticipated would include the following: Why is there no record of the initial Ehrlichman-Cushman contact? If Cushman recorded the conversation with Hunt, was he not already suspicious of the latter's purpose and why didn't he ask? At a minimum, could he not have inquired whether "the individual whose ideology we aren't entirely sure of" was an American citizen? 00428 CONFIDENTIAL [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 438 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 CONFIDENTIAL When Cushman told Ehrlichman on 27 August 1971 that CIA was suspending support to Hunt, was it only on the ground that the latter had become "too demanding"? Why was the personality study on Ellsberg provided when it was obvious that this action transgressed the Agency's charter? Obviously most questions which will be raised can only be answered by Helms and Cushman personally. Nevertheless, I think the DCI would be well advised to provide a candid evaluation of these proceedings in his initial statement. To do so voluntarily would make more persuasive the assurances the Committee will want that nothing of the sort will be done under his direction of the Agency. John Huizenga 00429 - 2 - CONFIDENTIAL [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 482 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 21 AUG 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence FROM : Inspector General SUBJECT : Use and Control of Disguise and Alias Documents Action Requested: 1. The attached report resulted from our general inquiries into Watergate-related issues and contains recommendations in paragraph 9 for your approval. Background: 2. In the course of collecting information on various activi- ties of the Agency with flap potential, we received a number of The Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee noted on the face of the summary submitted by the Office of Technical Services (OTS) on materials issued by it that it would be interesting to check the reports of other components to see if they matched with OTS issu- ances. In fact, OTS is not the only component to issue alias documentation, and the review was broadened to include the other issuing components and their procedures for controlling the materials. The attached report summarizes the findings. Donald F. Chamberlain Inspector General Attachment As Stated Above APPROVED: [signature] DATE: 24 AUG 1973 DISAPPROVED: _________________ DATE: ________ 00473 SECRET [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 483 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 USE AND CONTROL OF DISGUISE AND ALIAS DOCUMENTS General 1. The policy, responsibilities, and procedures concerning U.S. documentation issued to authenticate a false identity used in the Directorate of Operations are set forth in CSI [word?] 240-1 dated 23 August 1972. This instruction, a revision of CSI 220-1 dated 12 May 1959, represents an extensive upgrading in the definition of responsibilities and in establishing procedures ensuring that each request has the approval of a designated senior official in the component. The current instruction, furthermore, requires that each request be routed through Cover and Commercial Staff, Official Cover Branch (CCS/OCB) for concurrence, which, in effect, makes CCS/OCB the one component retaining complete records and details of every request. There are no other regulations applying to this subject, but it currently is observed by all components. Issuing Responsibilities and Procedures 2. Three major components are responsible for issuing alias documentation and/or disguise. The specific responsibilities are: a. [REDACTED] This office issues non-backstopped documents in aliases which are used exclusively for flash identification purposes. Birth certificates in alias are considered to be a special document and require a uniquely prescribed approval procedure and control. This Branch also responds for disguises. b. [REDACTED] Issues driver's licenses which are fully backstopped as well as fully backstopped investigative credentials. c. [REDACTED] SECRET 00474 [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 484 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 3. All requests to any of the above three components for alias documentation or disguise must be by memorandum and must be signed by one of two authorized officers designated by the requesting component. The instruction requires that this approval authority be confirmed to the chief of the division or staff, or to a senior operations officer specifically designated by the division staff chief to exercise this function. The request is routed through OSIS/OCS for concurrence at which time the requesting signature is verified as being on the approved list and all of the documents requested are recorded in the OCB file. All requests for documents to be used in CONUS are then routed to Office of Security, Operational Support Division, Special Activities Branch for approval and then are forwarded to the component which is to issue the documents. Issuing components are required to maintain controls on accountability and establish conditions for use of documents that they issue. OPS is developing a new computerized system which is scheduled to become operational in November 1973. Every six months each component will be given a complete listing of all documentation and disguises issued to them and they will be required to either justify the continued retention of the documents or return them. Component Controls 4. There is no established procedure prescribing how each component is to control the documents issued to it. The instructions do require, however, that the documents will be handled as controlled documents from the time of issue until their ultimate disposition. The general practice is to maintain a record of all documents received within the component, but to issue the documents to the appropriate officers who assume responsibility for handling them properly. There is no evidence of periodic spot checking. At least one area division of the Directorate of Operations follows a procedure which requires that the documents be retained in the front office until needed for an operation, being returned after the operation is completed. On the surface this may appear to be a strict control; yet in actuality the documents are retained in individual packages for each senior officer, and are never inspected before they are issued nor after they are returned; in effect, no record accountability by the officer is required. Ultimate Document Retrieval 5. Every employee using alias documents is now required to process through OCS as part of his exit-out process for either resignation or retirement. It is at this time that he is given a list of all alias documentation issued to him and is requested to return all such documents. If there are any of these documents - 2 - 00475 [SECRET stamp visible at bottom] [vision-ocr] --- PAGE 485 --- MORI DocID: 1451843 which he is unable to produce, the employee must submit a signed written statement describing, to the best of his ability, the conditions under which the document or documents were either lost or destroyed. The controls that now exist were not in operation when Howard Hunt was an employee, which may explain how he was able to obtain documents issued in the 1960s. Nor do these controls apply effectively to non-employees over whom the Agency has no control. Most disguise material -- other than documents -- is regarded as retrievable and non-sensitive and OTS is not too concerned if disguise material is not returned. 6. A new computerized system is being readied called CENBAD (Central Badge and Credential System). Initially this system will include all of the issuances of the badge office, CCS, Central Processing and the motor pool. The system will provide a monthly listing to these four components of all credentials issued and could be used to request outstanding credentials at the time of checkout. As a follow-up the system will provide a weekly credential status of all employees who have separated but for whom CENBAD still shows outstanding credentials. Conclusions 7. Since the issuance of DOI 240-4 there has been a very definite improvement in the controls exercised over alias documentation. By requiring that every request be routed through CCS/OCB for concurrence, a very complete file of all alias documents issued has been compiled. The probability is slight that an Agency employee could design or retire an alias without having been queried about all alias documents which had been issued to him. This practice, while currently observed in the Agency, has no standing as a general requirement and exists only as an administrative instruction in one of the Agency's directorates. 8. The OTS computerized system, when operational, should tend to reduce the number of outstanding documents since a justification every six months will be required for their retention. The CENBAD system will not only make the CCS/OCB control even more effective by mechanizing the up-to-date listing but in the rare instances when an officer might depart without turning in his documents, CENBAD will provide this data weekly to allow for a follow-up. - 3 - 00476 SECRET [vision-ocr]